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Abstract. Today, telecommunication service providers (telcos) are ex-
posed to cyber-attacks executed by compromised IoT devices connected
to their customers’ networks. Such attacks might have severe effects not
only on the target of attacks but also on the telcos themselves. To mit-
igate those risks we propose a machine learning based method that can
detect devices of specific vulnerable IoT models connected behind a do-
mestic NAT, thereby identifying home networks that pose a risk to the
telco’s infrastructure and availability of services. As part of the effort to
preserve the domestic customers’ privacy, our method relies on NetFlow
data solely, refraining from inspecting the payload. To promote future
research in this domain we share our novel dataset, collected in our lab
from numerous and various commercial IoT devices.
Keywords: Internet of Things (IoT), Network Address Translation (NAT),
Device Identification, Machine Learning, Network Traffic Analysis.
1 Introduction
The ability to launch massive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks via a
botnet of compromised devices is an exponentially growing risk in the Internet
of Things (IoT) [7,23]. Such massive attacks, possibly emerging from IoT devices
in home networks [12], hit not only the target of the attacks, but also the infras-
tructure of telecommunication service providers (telcos) along the attack path as
well. By virtue of the huge bandwidth that is assigned to customers nowadays,
the combined traffic surge from infected IoT devices that might hit the telco’s
infrastructure could eventually overload it. This might cause episodic downtime
and serious backlashes in the form of widespread customer dissatisfaction.
Typically, IoT-based DDoS attacks rely on exploiting vulnerabilities of spe-
cific models of IoT devices [12]. In such cases most domestic customers who con-
nect IoT devices to their home networks don’t have the knowledge or means to
handle ongoing attacks, and the burden of preventing them falls on the telco. To
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effectively scale and defend against IoT-based attacks launched from customers’
premises, telcos can continuously monitor the traffic of their customers. Based
on the monitored traffic, telcos can detect exploitation attempts, infections, and
executed attacks on third parties, and then block these activities. However, this
approach might be too late and result in service malfunctions and also hurt the
telco’s reputation. Due to these reasons, we propose a method for detecting con-
nected vulnerable IoT models before they are compromised. Thus, in the case
of DDoS attacks, our method can facilitate offloading of huge traffic amounts
generated by an abundance of infected domestic IoT devices. In turn, this can
prevent the combined traffic surge from hitting the telco’s infrastructure, reduce
the likelihood of service disruption and ensure continued service availability.
In this paper we propose a novel method for telcos to mitigate the above IoT-
related risks posed by their domestic customers. It relies on monitoring the traffic
of each smart home separately in order to verify: Is an IoT model, known to be
vulnerable to a DDoS attack, connected to this network or not? This method
relies on NetFlow records and it does not violate the privacy of customers since
it does not analyze traffic payloads. A telco using our proposed method can (1)
detect vulnerable IoT devices connected behind a NAT, and (2) use this infor-
mation to take actions. We empirically evaluate our method on genuine NetFlow
records collected in our lab for a period of ten days from numerous commercial
smart home IoT devices. We also compare our NetFlow-based method to two
existing deNATing methods: (1) a domain-based method [11] and (2) a method
which is based on DNS IP-ID [19]; we evaluate them empirically on packet-level
data collected simultaneously from the same network. Unlike some past studies
which applied their methods to partially, questionably, or completely unlabeled
datasets, our datasets are explicitly labeled with the device model. We share all
of our datasets with the scientific community to promote future reproducible
research, so given the ground truth labeling, both our study and future studies
can be truthfully evaluated in terms of classification performance.
2 Background
2.1 NATing, deNATing and IoT Identification Behind a NAT
In home networks it is common [10, 16] to use NAT-enabled Wi-Fi routers. As
part of NATing the outbound traffic, the NAT routers effectively ’hide’ the in-
ternal IP addresses of individual connected devices by replacing them with the
router’s external IP address. Once NATed, it becomes difficult to correlate each
packet to its packet stream from the outside. As described by [19], deNATing
is the reverse of NATing, and it aims at re-identifying the communication flow-
ing through a NAT. In Section 4, we survey existing deNATing methods and
illustrate their shortcomings with regard to our use case.
In the IoT identification literature it is typically required to analyze chrono-
logical sequences of packets [14,18] or sessions [17] for device (type) fingerprinting
or even for the basic calculation of inter-arrival times [15,22]. When the traffic is
NATed separating multiple packets into distinct timely sequences becomes a real
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challenge, thus the validity of existing IoT identification methods is undermined.
To overcome this, we propose to use the popular NetFlow protocol (discussed
next), which already aggregates packets internally into (Net)Flows. Nonetheless,
although NetFlow practically performs deNATing internally, the detection of
specific IoT models based on a single NetFlow remains a definitive challenge.
2.2 NetFlow as a Basis for Privacy-Preserving Traffic Analysis
In the domain of network traffic analysis several levels of data granularity are
typically used to define an entity, such as a packet, a transaction, a session, a
flow, a conversation window, etc. [3,4]. Among them, packet-level traffic analysis
is a common approach, wherein deep packet inspection (DPI) is an accepted
conduct [8]. This approach requires the capturing and analysis of highly-detailed
network traffic data including the payload of each packet. Although potentially
informative for IoT model detection, there are some known disadvantages [13]
to using DPI in terms of efficiency and privacy preserving, as follows.
– Efficiency: The collection and analysis of the entire raw traffic (including
the payload) in networks of high traffic rates is technically challenging. For a
telco, the traffic volume can reach up to multiple Gigabits per second and it
is far from trivial to capture and analyze such tremendous amounts of data.
– Privacy preserving: DPI allows the telco access to its customers’ personal
information. Even more dangerously, in case this data is leaked, there is a
privacy risk to the communicating parties, as this information might expose
private data (e.g., video captures that are transmitted over HTTP).
To address the above disadvantages we propose to use NetFlow [6] instead.
NetFlow was integrated as a feature in Cisco’s routers and provides the capa-
bility to summarize IP network traffic passing through an interface. By relying
only on traffic statistics and metadata aggregated by NetFlow, we preserve the
privacy of the communicating parties. We do not access the actual payload and
we do not use this information at all in our method. In addition, collecting and
analyzing only NetFlow’s statistical aggregations instead of the raw data re-
quires significantly less computation and storage, thus making the analysis more
efficient. It is also worth mentioning that NetFlow is a common solution natively
supported by most routers [26], and it is acknowledged as the de-facto standard
for compact representation of large traffic rates. Actually, NetFlow was also used
in the past for security-related tasks like Botnets detection and deNATing and
has already been introduced as a privacy preserving solution [1, 11,26].
2.3 System and Threat Model
Our system model is a typical network setup found in smart homes. The IoT
devices are connected to a gateway router providing an interface for connecting
IP-enabled devices to the Internet. We assume that during the initial setup when
the IoT devices connect to the network they possibly have security vulnerabilities
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that are not yet exploited. In our threat model, we assume that (1) our network
setup is likely to be targeted with attacks (e.g., DDoS) which could be carried
out by botnets such as Mirai; (2) The telco would like to observe the traffic
emerging from the customers’ premises which are NATed; (3) The telco is a
passive listener who wishes to block the IoT devices which are vulnerable and
susceptible to cyberattacks; and (4) The telco does not know which applications
are running and will preserve privacy while monitoring the traffic.
3 Research Goals and Contributions
We focus on the following questions:
1. Can we detect IoT models connected behind a NAT by analyzing NetFlows?
2. Can we perform this detection without compromising the users’ privacy?
3. Can we provide satisfactory detection performance for a large variety of IoT
models and validate our approach to be better than state of the art?
We summarize our contributions as follows:
1. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply machine learning
techniques to NATed network traffic for IoT model detection.
2. The current state of the art relies on data sources and features that necessi-
tate the analysis of high-definition data and thus compromise users’ privacy.
In our approach we preserve privacy, mostly by using only common meta-
features extracted by NetFlow.
3. We evaluate our method using genuine traffic data collected from various IoT
devices, and demonstrate that we can detect IoT models behind a NAT. We
also share both our NetFlow and pcap datasets with the scientific community.
4 Related Work
4.1 Scope and Orientation
Several prior NAT-related studies (for example, [10]) focused on identifying the
presence of a NAT device in a network. We refer to them as non-deNATing, since
they don’t perform classical deNATing, i.e., they don’t divide NATed traffic (all
with the same source IP of the NAT router) into distinct packet streams for
further analysis. As can be seen in Table 1, most of the other studies aimed
at uncovering the identity and/or the quantity of the devices connected behind
such NAT devices, or the people who use them. Some motivations for doing so:
– Security: Detecting attackers [20] or devices that are vulnerable [11, 21] or
infected by a malware [19].
– Traffic management: Applying policies such as parental browsing control
or per device communication limits [19], as well as traffic interception.
– Commerce: Traffic profiling for targeted advertising [19].
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– Privacy violation: Inferring user connectivity [26] and behavior [2].
Our motivation is also security-oriented; it reflects the viewpoint of a telco
wishing to defend against IoT botnets that might severely impact the commu-
nication availability. Unlike prior studies whose subject of interest was (NATed)
operating systems [19] or people and their behavior [2, 20, 24, 26], our method
is designed to detect connected IoT device models. Additionally, in contrast to
some NAT-related studies performed in the past which addressed large-scale en-
vironments like smart cities [11,21,24,26] and smart manufacturing [9–11,21], we
tailored our method to smart homes. We evaluated it empirically using a wide
range of popular home (consumer) IoT devices like smart light bulbs, sockets,
and webcams, as well as laptops and smartphones.
Table 1: The scope and orientation of previously-conducted deNAT-related stud-
ies
4.2 Methods and Evaluation
As summarized in Table 2, a variety of data sources and related methods have
been proposed for deNATing. Most of them rely on features extracted directly
from the TCP/IP model, however in some cases they might fail to address our
use case. For instance, features from the application layer like the HTTP user
agent [10], MSN transaction ID [20], and DNS domains [2] might not be available
to the telco when the traffic is encrypted. In contrast, we use NetFlow which ex-
tracts data from different layers (such as the network and transport layers which
are usually not encrypted), as well as metadata like traffic rates and volumes.
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The TCP timestamp is another commonly used feature in deNATing [19, 25],
however its analysis requires a minimal number of packets, and it might even
be disabled. Moreover, many IoTs use the UDP transport protocol, so the ro-
bustness of this feature becomes questionable. In contrast, our NetFlow-based
method can handle both TCP and UDP, so it covers a wider range of IoT models.
Other approaches relied on the server(s) the IoT devices communicate with [2]
and the related DNS domains [11]. With NetFlow, we can analyze all kinds of
traffic and not just specific types such as DNS. Some works relied on the IP
TTL [16] based on the assumption that a NAT device decrements its value by
one, however the value at which it decrements might differ among various NAT
devices. Others proposed using the open ports [9] to deduce the traffic’s origin.
However, these studies aimed at roughly distinguishing between SCADA and
non-SCADA traffic. Our method is better suited for the given use case, as it
proposes fine-grained classification. We have empirically shown that our method
is effective at distinguishing between multiple IoT models, even among specific
models of the same make (e.g., different D-Link webcams).
Table 2: The methods used by previous deNAT-related studies
For empirical evaluation, most prior studies used tcpdump log files, Shodan
scans [9, 21], or simulated data [24]. In some cases, the dataset is not available
for research reproduction [10]; in some cases, it is questionably labeled [11] or
not at all [16]; and in most cases, it does not represent smart homes. Moreover,
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even if labeling is present, the data only comes from non-IoT hosts [20], and
the class does not reflect the device model [19]. In contrast, in our research we
use NetFlow records, collected in our controlled home-like lab for a period of
ten days from various IoT and non-IoT devices. For benchmarking we also si-
multaneously collected pcap files, and most importantly, we explicitly labeled
our data with the ground truth regarding the device models. We believe that
the novelty, authenticity, diversity, scope, and reliability of our publicly avail-
able datasets will facilitate future research and may serve as a benchmark for
deNATing algorithms, specifically in the context of smart homes.
5 Proposed Method
Whenever a harmful IoT exploit is discovered (step 1 in Figure 1), and a related
vulnerability is identified (step 2) in a certain IoT model, a telco might want to
mitigate the associated risk to its network. To accomplish this, the first step is
to detect the presence of such IoT devices among the telco’s customers.
Fig. 1: An overview of the key steps in our proposed method
In order to detect IoT device models connected behind domestic NATs, we
propose a method consisting of central training (steps 3-4) which maximizes
efficiency and control, followed by local deployment (steps 5-7) of the trained
classifier. We use the following notation for describing our proposed method,
which is reproduced for every IoT model separately:
M : Model of an IoT device, defined by the combination of its type, make, and
version. For example, webcam.D Link.DCS 933L and webcam.D Link.DCS
942L are two separate IoT models which share the same type and make.
DM : Devices {dM1 , . . . , dMn }, instances of IoT model M , each defined by a
unique MAC address.
L: Lab which is used for collecting and analyzing traffic data from DM .
This central lab can be operated by the telco itself or a third party.
f : Flow, an aggregation of the communication between a client and a server,
produced using NetFlow, defined by the (1) ingress interface, (2) source
IP address, (3) destination IP address, (4) IP protocol, (5) source port,
(6) destination port, and (7) IP type of service.
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FM : Flow-level dataset, collected in L from DM , using NetFlow and nProbe.
FMtraining, F
M
validation: Training and validation sets for M , containing only flows gener-
ated by IoT devices of model M .
Ftest: Test set, containing flows from various Ms and also non-IoTs such as
PCs, smartphones, etc.
CM : One-class classifier for M , trained in L using FMtraining and F
M
validation.
H: Homes {h1, . . . , hk}, monitored networks of the telco’s customers.
LD: Local detectors {ld1, . . . , ldk}. Each ldi is an agent which monitors the
NetFlows emerging from the respective home hi in order to decide whether
an IoT device of model M is connected behind hi’s NAT or not.
SC
M
f : Anomaly score assigned to a flow f by the one-class classifier C
M . The
lower this score is, the more chances that f originated from M .
th: Threshold used to determine if a flow f originated from M or not. Flows
with scores below th are classified as originating from non-M devices.
5.1 Central Training
For a potentially vulnerable IoT model M , devices DM are to be connected to L’s
internal network behind a NAT. Upon normal usage of DM , network traffic data
is generated and subsequently processed by NetFlow, which is installed on the
NAT router. The produced flows are continuously collected (step 3) using nProbe
into a designated server for storage, thus accumulating the raw flow-level dataset
FM . Having gathered a sufficient amount of flows in FM , preprocessing steps are
to be undertaken, followed by the application of machine learning techniques for
training and fine-tuning a classifier CM (step 4). Instead of conventional binary
or multi-class supervised algorithms we propose to train a one-class classifier for
each M separately. With this approach (1) FM is quickly collected, (2) CM is
trained independently from any non-M device (IoT or not), and (3) CM can be
shared among telcos or other organizations as a standalone classifier.
5.2 Local Deployment
In order to preserve the privacy of end users, a telco can deploy a traffic moni-
toring solution only from outside its customers’ premises. This solution cannot
be implemented on the home router (location 1 in Figure 2) because end users
are not obligated to using any type of router. Instead, we propose to place our
solution on a hardware agent situated outside the customers’ premises, between
the home router and the ONT (location 2 in Figure. 2). This local detector mon-
itors the (NATed) traffic data emerging from the home network, and applies the
pre-trained classifier in order to detect connected IoT devices of model M .
In step 5 the centrally trained classifier CM is ditributed among the local
detectors LD. Each ldi can be implemented using a low-cost thin computer
(such as Raspberry Pi), and should have the following software components: (1)
nProbe for collecting flows from hi, (2) a software environment (e.g., Python) for
preprocessing the flows, (3) the trained classifier CM and (4) a software compo-
nent capable of decision-making and executing actions based on the classification
results. As part of continuous monitoring (step 6) each f collected by ldi from
Privacy-Preserving Detection of IoT Devices Connected Behind a NAT 9
Fig. 2: Possible locations along the network to deploy the IoT model detection
method
hi is preprocessed exactly the way it was in L, in order to achieve the same data
structure and scale. Then, f is assigned an anomaly score SC
M
f by C
M . If SC
M
f
< th, f is marked as generated by an IoT device of model M (step 7).
5.3 Actions to be Triggered by IoT Model Detection
A positive classification by ldi can trigger various automated reactions, including:
Traffic blocking: This is probably the most severe reaction, and it is not
advised to be taken immediately. The reason is that in false positive detections,
traffic blocking means denial of service to legitimate devices, followed by cus-
tomer dissatisfaction and damage to the reputation of the telco.
Email notification: A more moderate (and perhaps more productive) re-
action is to tell the customer that a vulnerable IoT device might be connected
to the network, so a software update or a change of password are advised.
Additional verification: Although privacy-preserving, detection that is
based only on metadata in a single NetFlow cannot guarantee perfect results
(i.e., without any false positives). Therefore, a cascading verification process, in
which an additional classifier confirms the detection, can be considered.
We are aware that typically a telco can already see all packet contents in-
cluding application layer data. Still, we propose the telco to rely solely on the
local detectors for data collection, analysis and automated reaction. The main
reason is that a central monitoring solution would probably end up with a table
that holds information on IoT devices owned by specific customers. On top of
the privacy violation, this table could become a valuable goal for attackers.
6 Evaluation Method
6.1 Lab Setup
In order to collect representative data, imitating a real-world scenario of var-
ious IoT devices connected behind a NAT, we set up a dedicated network as
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illustrated in Figure 3. First, we partitioned a switch into two VLANs: V LANin
and V LANout, representing the home network and the telco side respectively.
Then, we connected a variety of commercial IoT devices, as well as laptops and
smartphones (details are provided in Table 3), to V LANin via a wireless access
point. We also connected V LANin to a NAT router, where NetFlow is already
installed. In turn, we connected the router to V LANout, which was connected
to the Internet. To imitate the stages of central training and local deployment,
we installed nProbe on a server and a Raspberry Pi respectively, to collect the
NetFlow records from the router and analyze them accordingly. In addition, to
enable the comparison of our method to previous studies, we also performed port
mirroring from V LANin and V LANout and captured pcap files using Wireshark.
Fig. 3: Our evaluation setup, imitating a customer’s smart home
6.2 Data Acquisition
Data collection. We operated the devices routinely over a period of approxi-
mately ten days to collect genuine traffic data. For instance, we made the web-
cams send videos, turned on and off the sockets and the light bulb, surfed the
Web via the laptops and smartphones, etc. The resultant traffic was captured
simultaneously using NetFlow and Wireshark.
Ground truth labeling. In our lab we recorded flows both behind and in
front of the NAT, and we also made sure to configure static IPs in the internal
network. This way we were able to match each external outbound flow (labeled
with the source IP address of the router) with its internal twin, correctly labeled
with the source IP. By matching these with a table of IP/MAC/device model,
we labeled the NetFlows for analysis. We repeated the same matching procedure
with the pcap files, so the ground truth labels are available for them as well.
Feature extraction. We used the following NetFlow features [5] as a feature
set that is minimal yet potentially informative for IoT model detection:
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1. IN BYTES: The number of incoming bytes associated with an IP Flow
2. OUT BYTES: The number of outgoing bytes associated with an IP Flow
3. DST TOS: Type of Service byte setting when exiting outgoing interface
4. SRC TOS: Type of Service byte setting when entering incoming interface
5. PROTOCOL: IP protocol byte
6. L4 DST PORT: TCP/UDP destination port number
7. L7 PROTO NAME: Layer 7 protocol name
8. flow duration: Extracted from NetFlow by subtracting FLOW START
MILLISECONDS from FLOW END MILLISECONDS
6.3 Preprocessing and Experimentation
First, we partitioned F chronologically, such that the earliest 70% of each de-
vice (identified by the MAC address) is included in FMtraining, the next 10% in
FMvalidation and the remaining (latest) 20% in Ftest. Then, using Python and
Scikit-Learn, we repeated the following experiment 13 times, once for each M :
1. We filtered out all of the non-M flows from both FMtraining and F
M
validation,
because we chose the technique of one-class classification.
2. In FMtraining we scaled the numeric features to the range of [0,1] and encoded
the categorical features into dummy variables of the same range.
3. While preprocessing FMvalidation and Ftest we performed the same scaling and
encoding, specific to the current M . Consequently, the number of dummy
variables differs among IoT models, depending on the number of unique
values found in FMtraining for each categorical feature (e.g., L4 DST PORT).
4. We trained CM on FMtraining and saved it to the disk to enable distribution
to the local detectors. In preliminary experimentation we found that the
Isolation Forest algorithm performs much better than One-Class SVM and
Local Outlier Factor (LoF), so we chose it as the sole algorithm in our study.
5. We applied CM to Ftest to evaluate the method’s classification performance.
6.4 Performance Metrics
We used the following widely-accepted metrics to evaluate our detection method:
1. True Positive Rate (TPR): Ratio of cases where f was generated by M and
truthfully detected as such by CM .
2. False Positive Rate (FPR): Ratio of cases where f was not generated by M
but falsely classified as such by CM .
3. The area under the ROC curve (ROC AUC): Class discrimination capability
for differing th values.
4. Time to detect: Depends on the interarrival time (IAT) of fM , as well as its
duration, preprocessing, and classification times.
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Table 3: The IoT models in our experiments, their datasets and the classification
performance using Ftest
7 Results and Discussion
7.1 Experimental Results
Our experiments are summarized in Table 3, sorted by the number of NetFlows.
Excluding the bottom seven rows (non-IoTs), leads to the following conclusions:
– Training time. The mean (standard deviation) of the time it takes to train
CM is only 3.15 (2.81) seconds. Thus, frequent retraining for performance
improvements is highly feasible.
– Classifier size. CM requires very little disk space - just 1,350.62 (280.39)
KB. Thus, deploying it on thin local detectors is practical.
– Time to detect. The time it takes to preprocess a given f is in the order
of microseconds, and so is the classification time; thus, both are negligible.
The IAT and duration of f are much more significant, and their sum (shown
in Table 3) varies between approximately 4 and 18 minutes.
– ROC AUC. For mostMs, reasonable values of 0.85 (0.05) are attained using
Ftest. Only webcam.Sricam.SP017 performs substantially worse; a closer look
revealed that in about 19% of cases it is confused with webcam.Amcrest.IPM
723S. Apparently, the reason for this confusion is the substantial overlap
in their communicated domains, including Amazon, HTTP.Amazon, NTP,
NTP.Amazon, and SSL.Amazon. Figure 4(a) shows how almost all of the
ROC curves (one for each M) share the same shape.
– Default TPR and FPR. When f ’s classification is determined based on
comparing SC
M
f to Scikit-Learn’s default th, a TPR of 0.76 (0.04) is obtained.
This means that, on average, when an IoT device of model M is connected
behind a NAT, a telco can detect it in 76% of the cases based only on meta-
data captured in a single NetFlow. Consequent actions (see Subsection 5.3)
can then substantially mitigate the risk to the telco’s infrastructure and
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service. Unfortunately, this TPR is accompanied by an FPR of 0.13 (0.20),
meaning that in too many cases false alarms are generated. Hence, we looked
for solutions to reduce the FPR while preserving satisfactory TPR levels.
– SC
M
f -percentile-based TPR and FPR. While searching for methods to
overcome the challenge of high FPR, we noticed that using FMvalidation for th
calibration can improve the classification performance using Ftest. That is,
we (1) trained the classifier CM using FMtraining, (2) applied C
M to FMvalidation,
(3) calculated a predefined percentile of the resultant distribution of the
score SC
M
f and (4) used this value as the new th to act as a classifica-
tion threshold when using Ftest. So, for varying percentiles [0, 30] of S
CM
f
on FMvalidation we recalculated the TPR and the FPR using Ftest, and we
found that the 10th percentile (annotated P 10 in Table 3) provides the best
results: A decrease of FPR for almost all the IoT models, and most sub-
stantially for webcam.Edimax.IC 3116W, webcam.Amcrest.IPM HX1B and
socket.TP Link.HS110. Actually, for two Ms the FPR decreased to abso-
lute zero, and for five others the FPR was found to be 0.02 or less. Overall,
the FPR decreased to 0.11 (0.21) with a cost of reducing the TPR to 0.73
(0.05). We note that this level of performance is yet to be improved in order
to support actual deployment by a telco, and we discuss it in Subsection 7.3.
7.2 Benchmarking
In order to evaluate our proposed method more comprehensively, we decided to
empirically compare it with two current deNATing methods. We implemented
them in our lab with a few necessary adjustments, and because they use packet-
level traffic data we tested them on pcap files that had been collected simulta-
neously by Wireshark.
DNS IP-ID-Based deNATing The method proposed in [19] aimed at de-
NATing traffic of devices using the same OS, rather than detecting different
IoT models. It relies on the fact that the IP-ID field in some OSs is consis-
tently incremented for successive packets sent to the same destination IP. Since
DNS requests to the same DNS resolver are sent to the same destination IP, the
value of the IP-ID field is monotonically increasing between DNS requests. Thus,
tracking IP-ID values of multiple DNS requests coming out of an NAT router to
the same resolver may assist in correlating subsequent packets of distinct devices
behind the NAT.
The researchers experimented with Windows 8 and 10, and Android. They
showed that for successive DNS requests the difference in IP-ID values is very
stable (see Fig. 4(c)) and almost always equals one. This makes deNATing rather
simple and effective with these OSs, unlike our Linux-based IoTs, where the
difference was found to be highly variable (see Fig. 4(b)). Still, as can be seen
in Fig. 4(d), different IoT models may increment their respective DNS IP-ID
values in a consistent and characteristic way, such that robust linear regression
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(a) (a) ROC curves for multiple IoT
models M using Ftest, based on classifying
NetFlows
(b) (b) Distribution of the increment in IP-ID
values of DNS requests for IoT models in our
experiment
(c) (c) DNS IP-ID of four Windows-
and Android-based hosts over time
(adapted from [19])
(d) (d) DNS IP-ID of two Linux-based IoT mod-
els over time (gathered from our experiments),
motivating the ”slope-matching” idea
Fig. 4: Experimental results using Ftest
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models can be trained. In turn, the trained slopes can be compared with the
ones found in a test set. A good match between trained and observed slopes can
be the basis for an IoT model detection technique. We leave this to future work.
DNS Domain-Based deNATing In [11] the objective was to identify the type
of NATed IoT devices, similarly to this paper. For each IoT device the authors
tracked a list of communicated device-facing server names. Then, during a test
period, if the number of communicated device server names from the related
list surpassed a threshold, they inferred that the device type is present. Their
method is somewhat limited as it poses the following constraints on the type
and quantity of the communicated servers:
– It excludes third party and human-facing server names to minimize the FPR.
– It excludes device types which communicate with less than three servers.
– If an overlap exists among the server names of multiple device types, the
method cannot guarantee that the devices are distinguishable, and it reports
that at least one of them was detected.
Fig. 5: The domains (green nodes) requested by our IoT devices (blue). The red
node represents webcam.Sricam.SP017, which had the lowest ROC AUC.
Fig. 5 illustrates the results of applying the method proposed in [11] to our
test set. It presents the DNS domains (green nodes) requested by the IoT de-
vices (blue nodes) in our experiment, where it can be seen that some of them
are human-facing, some belong to third parties, and also an overlap of requested
domains clearly exists in our experiment. In practice, meeting all of the above
constraints would eliminate all the devices we experimented with, so we imple-
mented the DNS domain-based method without limiting the types of commu-
nicated servers. We also used the server names rather than their resolved IP
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addresses, in order to promote efficiency, while relying on the fact that Linux-
based IoT devices don’t support DNS caching. Also, in the original paper they
reported the detection performance on a time window of days. To compare the
performance of their method to ours more fairly, we examined it using a time
window of 10 minutes.
Altogether, only three of our IoT models met the criterion of at least three
device-facing communicated servers, and they performed well: a TPR of 1.00 for
all of them, an FPR of 0.00 for socket.TP Link.HS110 and webcam.Amcrest.IPM
HX1B, and an FPR of 0.56 for webcam.Edimax.IC 3116W. However, a coverage
of three out of 13 IoT models seems far from sufficient for a telco to implement.
7.3 Limitations
We are aware of some shortcomings of our proposed method, as follows. First,
upon deployment, a telco can train CM only after it purchases devices of model
M , configures them and collects a sufficient amount of NetFlow records. This
process might take few days to complete. However, we are not aware of any other
traffic-based detection method that can skip the time-consuming data acquisition
stage. To shorten this stage it is advised to connect multiple M devices. Second,
firmware updates to IoT models might make the classifiers obsolete. Again, any
other data-driven classifier would probably face the same challenge.
7.4 Future Research
The scope of this paper was limited to developing a method which is capable
of detecting vulnerable IoT models behind a NAT. However, detection is only a
first stage, to be complemented with locally-installed tools such as vulnerability
scanning (to check if the vulnerability has been patched) or virtual patching.
Additional challenges to address are (1) improving our method in terms of
the TPR and FPR, possibly using the cascading detection approach (discussed in
Subsection 5.3), (2) looking for solutions that are less costly than local detectors,
can support a multitude of households and are still privacy preserving, and (3)
exploring the potential of the DNS IP-ID ”slope matching” idea.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrated that using our proposed method enables a telco
to detect about 73% of any NATed IoT model of interest. This is a first step
towards dramatically mitigating the risk posed to the telco’s infrastructure by
domestic IoT devices that might be recruited to botnets. The detection takes
only few minutes, and is being performed while preserving customers’ privacy.
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